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• Deterrence and defence is back on NATO’s agen-
da, and so are hybrid threats and conflicts.
• Hybrid conflict has been seen as conflict short of 
war, but entails the potential for being used as an 
initial stage of war.
• A more seamless approach to deterrence is 
needed in order to meet both hybrid conflict and 
war.
• To achieve a deterrent effect, more effort should 
be put on developing potential response strate-
gies.
Takeaways
This IFS Insight briefly discusses current security challenges and deterrence in
general, before focusing on hybrid scenarios as a threat, and concludes by identifying 
three key steps for achieving a deterrent effect. I view this subject from a small state 
perspective, as smaller states with limited defence capabilities face particular 
challenges when it comes to traditional conflict as well as in the hybrid realm.1
Hybrid scenarios are often treated as a dis-
tinct category short of armed conflict, and 
thus escape the ramification of war as «po-
litically motivated use of force by generally 
recognized authorities».2 We should be more 
concerned with hybrid strategies and espe-
cially with potential use of hybrid scenarios 
in an initial stage of armed conflict. This calls 
for a seamless approach to deterrence strate-
gy that considers both traditional and hybrid 
threats.3
DETERRENCE
Since 2014, NATO’s agenda is increasingly 
shaped by an enhanced focus on classic 
NATO defence and deterrence. Following his 
inauguration as Supreme Allied Commander 
Europe, General Tod D. Wolters, stated that 
NATO is now all about deterrence, and that 
all aspects of the Alliance should reflect this, 
including force planning, forces posture 
exercises, and command structure. General 
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Walters recently stressed the need for deter-
rence in all domains to provide for adequate 
defence.4
This underlines NATO’s primary role in 
collective defence as a means to deter in or-
der to avoid open conflict. Current defence 
debates place much emphasis on «cash, capa-
bilities, and contributions», all of which are 
necessary. However, in a time of rapid change 
and in a world of increasing complexity and 
uncertainty, our focus in addition should be 
on developing new strategies. That is to say, 
how do we foresee the use of our capabilities 
to achieve the political aims we strive for? 
How do we use them to deter actions short of 
war? How can we know that hybrid actions 
are not employed as an initial stage of armed 
conflict?
As the world is clearly a different place 
than it was during the Cold War – politically, 
ideologically, economically and militarily 
– we cannot simply pull the old, pre-1989
strategies and doctrines off the shelf. Instead,
we must plan and develop new strategies
that meet the contexts and the challenges we
now face. Strategy is about ends and means.
This sounds simplistic, but developing good
strategies is one of the more complex chal-
lenges facing military officers, bureaucrats
and strategic thinkers alike. Strategy is dy-
namic – it is shaped by actions and respons-
es. As Carl von Clausewitz stated: in strategy,
the object reacts.5 Strategy is influenced by
the will of the population and by other stra-
tegic actors on both sides.  Developing strat-
egy is a creative activity in which we strive
to exploit our strengths and our enemy’s
weaknesses. Strategy is more often about
making the best of a suboptimal situation,
rather than creating a perfect harmonisation
of ends and means in a context favourable to
our strengths.
It may be easier to identify cases in which 
deterrence fails than when it succeeds. We 
never know with certainty whether our de-
terrence strategy worked, or whether it was 
decisive – and if it was, why. This is also a 
reason why it is difficult to prescribe strate-
gies for deterrence. Nonetheless, as hybrid 
threats are real and present, we are chal-
lenged to develop new strategies for defence 
and deterrence. The two are obviously linked.
A key to effective deterrence is to under-
stand the opponents, their value system, 
their logic. In our current context, we have 
been and are dealing with actors that seem to 
be as interested in regime survival and self-
preservation as they are about representing 
the collective interests of a given state, or the 
national interest. The domestic political situ-
ation, internal power structures and strug-
gles affect perceptions and influence judge-
ments and rationality. In western culture, 
war may be understood in a Clausewitzian 
way, as a distinct condition with clear begin-
ning and ending. Accordingly, military power 
is to be used only in exceptional cases, as a 
means of self defence and last resort, always 
aiming to restore peace, preferably a better 
peace. Other actors see it differently, and may 
not distinguish between peace and war and 
the use of power in the same way. 
Indeed, initiating and maintaining smaller 
conflicts on the periphery may be a way to 
prevent other actors from gaining influence 
and maintaing influence in areas of inter-
est. Or, it may increase status and prestige, 
improve recruitment, and so on. Thus, what 
may seem rational from our point of view 
may not appear rational from the view of the 
opposing side.
TECHNOLOGY
As a starting point, it is fundamental to ac-
cept the fact that modern military technology 
favours the offensive party, the aggressor 
if you will. This is the opposite conclusion 
of what was arrived at almost two hundred 
years ago by Clausewitz.6 Modern technol-
ogy offers a broad menu of approaches and 
courses of action, and it is challenging, if 
not impossible, to predict with the neces-
sary degree of precision the ways and means 
by which we will be challenged. One may 
interject that this has been a fact since the 
introduction of the nuclear bomb. The nu-
clear option, however, due to its devastating 
consequences, is far less politically available 
as a tool than current low-cost technologies. 
The nuclear option was and still is a weapon 
of last resort – to be used only in desperate 
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situations and with «mutual assured destruc-
tion» as a possible outcome. Modern technol-
ogies differ in this respect. The entire cyber 
domain, swarms of unmanned but heavily 
armed systems, missiles (both conventional 
and nuclear with multitude features, ranges 
and launch-systems), and the ability to 
swiftly mobilise and concentrate large con-
ventional forces, are all relevant options to-
day. The risk of becoming the victim of a fait 
accompli is clear and present.
Today, actors find themselves able to car-
ry out their plans and acts of aggression with 
little risk of being detected or exposed as 
responsible and accountable, making it even 
more likely that this advantage will be ex-
ploited. This is perhaps particularly relevant 
to the cyber domain, but it is relevant to the 
physical domain as well, with its missiles, 
«green men», the use of unmanned systems, 
and proxy forces.
THE THREAT DIMENSIONS
The security environment is characterised 
by relatively new and emerging threats and 
challenges to the West on at least three lev-
els.
Firstly, the nuclear dimension is back on 
the agenda. Nuclear weapons are modern-
ised, and the mechanisms for preventing 
proliferation and limiting nuclear stockpiles, 
of which the INF Treaty is only one example, 
are under pressure. Secondly, a technological 
revolution is playing out in the conventional 
dimension. It has been underway for some 
time, encompassing long range, hypersonic, 
high precision missiles, stealth, and space as-
sets, not to mention artificial intelligence and 
autonomous systems, resulting in increased 
lethality and decreased time for planning 
and decision-making. Elements of this have 
long been dubbed a revolution in military 
affairs. Artificial intelligence and autono-
mous systems underscore the revolutionary 
potential. Thirdly, everything short of armed 
conflict, be it «political warfare», «operations 
in the grey zone» or «hybrid warfare», may 
constitute a revolution in strategic affairs in 
the same way as the 9/11-attacks and global 
terrorism (or hyper-terrorism) were seen to 
revolutionise strategic affairs in 2001.7
HYBRID THREATS AND SCENARIOS
It is beyond the scope of this Insight to dis-
cuss the origin of the hybrid concept. It is be-
ing used by both states and non-state actors,8 
although since 2014 it has been predomi-
nantly associated in the West with Russian 
actions, sometimes referred to, somewhat 
misleadingly, as the Gerasimov Doctrine.9 Just 
as with any attempt to label various forms of 
conflict, the hybrid label also bears ambigui-
ties. 
Hybrid warfare is here seen as having two 
dimensions. The first is an ongoing, low-level 
form of strategic intimidation on its own 
terms, aiming to achieve objectives below 
the threshold of open, armed conflict, fall-
ing outside of the conventional perception 
of how war manifests itself. This may be its 
most immediate challenge, though not an 
existential one. Hybrid warfare may encom-
pass individual cyber attacks, disinformation 
activities and intelligence activities resulting 
in incidents on a scale that may constitute 
some kinds of crises to the opponent, but still 
manageable below the threshold of armed 
conflict or traditional war. 
Hybrid operations may also have a sec-
ond dimension. It is more and more com-
mon to see the gloomy and dire potential for 
employing hybrid techniques as the initial 
stage of a major conflict. Firstly, it may aim 
at degrading networks to prevent the West 
from exploiting the technological advan-
tage offered by our most valued equipment, 
modern communications, and precision and 
surveillance technology. Secondly, it may aim 
at creating confusion and distrust by exploit-
ing information campaigns with «fake news» 
and other forms of misinformation. Thirdly, 
it may specifically target our preparations for 
major conflict, such as mobilisation efforts, 
the transport of reinforcement forces, and 
our logistics buildup. Finally, key person-
nel, high value targets, like decision-makers 
or pilots can be targeted through the use of 
special forces, proxy forces or by individually 
tailored information packages aiming to de-
ter and dissuade.
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The overall purpose and combined effect 
of all this would be to shape the battlespace, 
setting conditions that deny the opponent, 
meaning the West, the luxury of exploiting 
its strengths. It may prevent us from arriv-
ing at the battlefield at all. If this holds true, 
what we have regarded as the first phase of 
any major conflict – a campaign in the air (as 
we have done ever since the first Gulf War in 
1991) – may have come to an end. In a future 
conflict, the first phase may be a hybrid – 
even a massive hybrid – phase.
At the same time, we should remember 
that conflicts below the threshold of tradi-
tional war, will always play out with the po-
tential for the use of kinetics looming in the 
background. We may think of these forms of 
conflict – i.e. nuclear, conventional and hy-
brid – as distinct categories, each with their 
own logic, but as our opponents clearly do 
not, we will have to think and act differently. 
A more seamless approach is needed. When 
we talk about deterrence in a hybrid scenario 
we must bear in mind two aspects:
- Deterring hybrid assaults from being
launched.
- If they are launched: deterring the conflict
from escalating further into the conven-
tional and nuclear domain, in other words
a form of escalation control.
Even from a small state perspective, tradi-
tional concepts of deterrence are relevant 
when we try to plan and develop policies and 
strategies for hybrid threats. It is still about 
adjusting the calculus in your favour. It is not 
necessarily about convincing an opponent 
about the costs of his actions; instead, it is 
about introducing sufficient doubt in his 
decision-making process. Doubt and lack of 
clarity can at times be as effective as abso-
lutes. Certain «red lines» may be necessary 
in our policy, particularly in order to commit 
our allies. Hence, clarity may promote enemy 
cohesion. On the other hand, lack of clarity 
may blur the nature of our responses and 
make the opponent uncertain and indecisive.
ATTRIBUTION – THE FIRST STEP OF 
EFFECTIVE DETERRENCE
Attribution is the obvious starting point of 
any discussion on deterrence and hybrid 
scenarios. Attribution is a challenging and 
complex issue. Who is behind certain actions 
leading up to a conflict? This is the key ques-
tion when addressing the hybrid challenge: 
the ability to identify the actors responsible, 
and the willingness to expose and confront 
them.
If your adversary is capable of wielding 
power through low-cost and low-dramatic 
tools and tactics without the risk of being 
exposed, his willingness to take risk will in-
crease. This may inspire aggressive actions to 
test our responses and our defence.
We must be able to collect information, to 
create an updated situational understanding, 
to produce the facts – and to do it fast. One 
of the challenges is to distinguish between 
on-going activity in peacetime and hybrid 
actions as part of preparations for high-end 
conflict or war.
Being able to document, to produce rele-
vant and sufficient evidence concerning who 
is responsible and what is going on is there-
fore essential in a deterrence strategy. We 
need not only maintain and further develop 
traditional surveillance and intelligence ca-
pabilities, we must also streamline the flow 
of information coming from other agencies 
and actors, such as the police, customs offi-
cials, the national guard, telecommunications 
– even the civilian population – and to fuse
all these sources into one intelligence or situ-
ational picture.
The point here is to develop the ability to 
attribute, to develop the required capabilities 
and structures and then to clearly commu-
nicate this ability, should we wish to do so. 
In some cases, silence might be appropriate 
in order not to disclose our methods and the 
fact that we know. In other cases, it is neces-
sary to confront our adversaries. Decision-
makers should have a real choice between no 
or limited public attention and concealing or 
disclosing the identities of the perpetrators, 
increasing the risk for the opposing side. 
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There is also a case to be made for better 
coordination between the national, multi-
national and Alliance levels. Hybrid attacks 
will most likely start as a national issue, but 
we must prepare for a collective response in 
order to enhance our capabilities and deter-
rence. As part of this, the question of attribu-
tion needs more harmonisation and coordi-
nation. We need a seamless approach.
ROBUST DEFENCE AND RESILIENCE
The second step is making the defence of 
infrastructure and capabilities more robust. 
Resilience will in many cases be our first line 
of defence, but it does not constitute a full 
fledged deterrence strategy. It should be re-
garded as a vital component of a strategy, not 
as the strategy.10 A resilient society is crucial, 
as it can limit the number of tools and tactics 
an adversary considers relevant to employ. 
Tough choices need to be made, between 
platforms and securing the networks in the 
cyber domain as well as other critical infra-
structure.
We most likely need to spend more money 
and resources on protecting our networks 
and other critical infrastructure, both civilian 
and military. If there will be a future battle of 
networks, we must prepare for it. We must 
constantly remind ourselves about the need 
for prioritising cyber and networks, as well 
as infrastructure in the broadest sense. If we 
do not, investments in modern warfighting 
platforms may become futile. This is a chal-
lenge, as the traditional and well-established 
domains have strong advocates in the tradi-
tional services. In the future, our infrastruc-
ture and means of communication will need 
strong advocates and proponents of their 
own.
STRATEGY OF DENIAL OR PUNISH-
MENT?11
The third step is to accept that we will have 
to rely also on strategies of punishment, or 
retaliation. For small states, with a limited 
number of capabilities this may be seen as ir-
relevant, as punishment may be regarded be-
yond realism for them. However, we cannot 
base our defence and strategy of deterrence 
on the ability to counter any action taken by 
our opponents, even less so since the offen-
sive side has the stronger hand. To foresee 
all eventualities, and find the resources to 
secure all our assets, are not possible. Hence, 
a strategy founded solely on denial is hollow 
and not credible.
Even small states will increasingly have 
to determine whether to include elements 
of punishment in their approach to hybrid 
threats – as a means to ensure credible de-
terrence. By doing this, one should have in 
mind that actions of punishment may trigger 
new attacks by the adversary. The escalation 
dilemma is thus a pressing issue.
In any cases, small states will have to rely on 
the support of key allies. Small states need 
to demonstrate a national will and capability 
to deter, but to do so within an allied frame-
work.
CONCLUSION
Hybrid strategies are often seen as alterna-
tives to well-known strategies of conflict and 
war. However, in the future, we need to think 
of hybrid strategies as a phase zero that may 
initiate war. This does not make it any easier 
to analyse hybrid scenarios that unfold on a 
daily basis. However, there are good reasons 
for integrating hybrid scenarios closer with 
the general defence strategies, and not treat-
ing them as a distinct category of its own.
Finally, it is important to underscore that, 
while defence and deterrence are central to 
our NATO strategy, we shall not ignore the 
third D, which is dialogue. We have a long 
history of balancing deterrence and defence 
with dialogue and confidence-building. We 
should maintain dialogue as a third pillar, 
and explore incentives for enhanced dia-
logue. There is no contradiction in such a 
policy, since strategies for defence and deter-
rence allow us to maintain a dialogue from 
a position of strength and self-confidence 
rather than from a position of weakness and 
diffidence.
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